Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood
In this remarkably brief opinion, Justice O'Connor, writing for a 9-0 Court, upholds the New Hampshire parental notification law, with the caveat that the statute may not be used to block abortions in (the relatively few) cases in which the mother's life or health is in danger.
This case strikes me as an example of judicial modesty. The crux of the reasoning revolves around deference to the democratic process. Instead of invalidating the statute wholesale because it failed to include a "life or health" exception, as the District Court did, the Supreme Court enjoined only the unconstitutional portions of the statute, while leaving the rest intact.
The Court offered three principles for this decision:
1. "First, we try not to nullify more of a legislature's work than is necessary, for we know a ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people." [citation & quotation omitted]
2. "Second, mindful that our constitutional mandate and institutional competence are limited, we restrain ourselves from rewriting state law to conform it to constitutional requirements even as we try to salvage it.... [M]aking distinctions in a murky constitutional context, or where line-drawing is inherently complex, may call for a far more serious invasion of the legislative domain than we ought to undertake." [citations & quotations omitted]
3. "Third...a court cannot use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature.... This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the government." [citations & quotations omitted]
It doesn't surprise me that Chief Justice Roberts joined the opinion, nor that Justices Thomas or Scalia did not provide separate concurrences. It's a modest opinion, offering a remedy that seeks to stay within judicial bounds, rather than encroaching on the domain of the legislature. I would have liked the Court to deal with the undue burden standard vs. the Salerno test, but this was not the opinion to wrestle with such a weighty issue--nor would it have been a mere ten pages (nor 9-0) if it were.
This case strikes me as an example of judicial modesty. The crux of the reasoning revolves around deference to the democratic process. Instead of invalidating the statute wholesale because it failed to include a "life or health" exception, as the District Court did, the Supreme Court enjoined only the unconstitutional portions of the statute, while leaving the rest intact.
The Court offered three principles for this decision:
1. "First, we try not to nullify more of a legislature's work than is necessary, for we know a ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people." [citation & quotation omitted]
2. "Second, mindful that our constitutional mandate and institutional competence are limited, we restrain ourselves from rewriting state law to conform it to constitutional requirements even as we try to salvage it.... [M]aking distinctions in a murky constitutional context, or where line-drawing is inherently complex, may call for a far more serious invasion of the legislative domain than we ought to undertake." [citations & quotations omitted]
3. "Third...a court cannot use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature.... This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the government." [citations & quotations omitted]
It doesn't surprise me that Chief Justice Roberts joined the opinion, nor that Justices Thomas or Scalia did not provide separate concurrences. It's a modest opinion, offering a remedy that seeks to stay within judicial bounds, rather than encroaching on the domain of the legislature. I would have liked the Court to deal with the undue burden standard vs. the Salerno test, but this was not the opinion to wrestle with such a weighty issue--nor would it have been a mere ten pages (nor 9-0) if it were.